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2. SUEZ DEVELOPMENTS

A		The nationalization of the Suez has gained more support for Na Egypt than any previous step he according to the American emb Cairo. Expressions of strong for the action have come not on street demonstrators but from fessional and business leaders been critical of the regime.	asr within has taken, hassy in support ly from some pro-
	in Cairo is	Despite this general support, he embassy notes that the business becoming concerned about the effects of	s community
	retanatory	y economic measures.	
	ures for the placing mathematical harbor are	ne defense of Alexandria, begun on 29 Ju achine guns and antiaircraft batteries wit	military meas- ly, include th radar in the
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	alleged Ind sions rega favor a wid	The American embassy in Colo ement on 30 July by Prime Minister Ban dian government interest in participating rding the Suez problem suggest these coder internationalization of the canal includes Asian nations.	daranaike and in any discus- untries might
	alleged Ind sions rega favor a wid	ement on 30 July by Prime Minister Ban dian government interest in participating ording the Suez problem suggest these co der internationalization of the canal inclu	daranaike and in any discus- untries might
	alleged Ind sions rega favor a wid	ement on 30 July by Prime Minister Ban dian government interest in participating ording the Suez problem suggest these co der internationalization of the canal inclu	daranaike and in any discus- untries might

25X1A	3. GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA HINT AT DISSOLUTION OF BALKAN ALLIANCE	
25X1A	Greece and Yugoslavia agree that the Balkan alliance cannot continue many more weeks in its present inactivity, according to Greek foreign minister Averoff. Averoff said that Yugoslav president Tito and Greek officials concluded at Corfu that, if the situation remains unchanged, it would be preferable for their two countries to reach a "bilateral understanding." Averoff reaffirmed Greece's firm attachment to the West and said such an arrangement would provide the West with a useful link with Yugoslavia.	
	Comment The Balkan alliance has been ineffective for the past year, owing primarily to Greek-Turkish animosities aroused by the Cyprus dispute and anti-Greek riots in Istanbul last September.	25X6
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4. INDONESIAN NATIONAL PARTY ELECTS MODERATE LEADERSHIP

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The election of Suwirjo as chairman of the Indonesian National Party, which heads the coalition cabinet, appears to reflect the moderation recently voiced by President Sukarno. The National Party, with which Sukarno has been closely identified, has been dominated for several years by its left wing, which

has advocated co-operation with the Communists. The moderates, led by Suwirjo, have frequently expressed alarm over growing Communist strength.

The National Party council advised party members on 1 August to "act wisely and withdraw" from the Communist-dominated All-Indonesian People's Congress. The National Party itself withdrew from the congress in June 1955.

Sukarno stated in his closing address to the convention that he wanted to see more than one party in Indonesia. He then named Indonesia's principal parties, omitting the Communist Party.

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5. ATTEMPTED	REVOLT IN HONDURAS	
ican embassy	The Honduran government appe control of the situation followin and army action against rebels tacked an army barracks near in Tegucigalpa early on 1 August.	g police who at-
which Lozano earlier unless Lozano failed	Political tension in the country nticipation of constituent assembly expanded as announced would be held on 7 Octobro to attend the meeting of presidents is settled conditions in his country.	lections ctober or onement.
elections. Vi	The Liberal Party, with Villed candidate, won a plurality in the null illeda, who heads the Communist-inf party, was exiled by Lozano on 9 July	ified 1954 Iuenced
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6. PROLONGED ASSEMBLY CRISIS POSSIBLE IN SOUTH KOREA

The attempt of South Korea's Public Security Bureau to serve summons on four opposition assemblymen is the latest move in what may become a prolonged political crisis. Tension continues in the assembly, and legislative activity has been at a standstill since 27 July, when opposition assemblymen clashed with police in demonstrations protesting the administration's harassment of opposition candidates for local office.

The four assemblymen are expected to ignore the police summons, and attempts to detain them forcibly would probably meet with considerable resistance. Antiadministration groups in the assembly have been joined by about 30 Liberals in demanding the release of an assemblyman jailed following the demonstrations on 27 July, and opposition assemblymen have stated their willingness to stimulate popular demonstrations "even at the cost of bloodshed" if their demands are not met.

An opposition legislator who conferred with Rhee on 31 July has stated that he was probably the first person to apprise Rhee of the gravity of the situation in the assembly. The speaker of the assembly, Yi Ki-pung, has stated that the minister of interior appears to be acting with a free hand.

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8.	TURKS (CONV	INCED	AFGE	IAN	PRE	MIER	MUST	\mathbf{BE}
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Turkish officials concluded during Prime Minister Menderes' visit to Kabul between 27 and 30 July that Afghan premier Daud must be ousted or compelled to change his policy.

Secretary General Birgi of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, who accompanied Menderes on the visit, based this conclusion on Daud's rejection of Menderes' suggestions for modification of Kabul's Pushtoonistan campaign against Pakistan and the Afghan premier's disregard of Turkish warnings against Soviet penetration. Daud's apparent rejection of a Turkish offer of military assistance probably also alienated Menderes and his party.

The Turks, on the other hand, were favorably impressed with King Zahir Shah, Foreign Minister Naim, and ex-prime minister Shah Mahmud. Menderes believes he was able to convince the king of the dangers of Soviet penetration.

Turkish-Afghan relations are traditionally close. If Menderes is convinced of the dangers of Daud's policies, Ankara may in the future become more interested in consorting with Pakistan and Iran to bring about a change in the Afghan government.

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